



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

The Individual: A Study of Life and Death. By NATHANIEL SOUTH-GATE SHALER. New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1900.—pp. xiii, 351.

The author of *The Individual* has already given us suggestive contributions to the humanistic bearings of natural science, in his delightfully written little books, *Nature and Man in America*, and *The Interpretation of Nature*. The present work is a more serious undertaking, but written with equal charm. Professor Shaler writes from the point of view of the naturalist, and he speaks with the caution and reserve of the true scientist. But he sees what most naturalists of the outgoing century have overlooked, viz., that the place of the *individual* in the universe is the central problem of the philosophy of nature. As a naturalist Professor Shaler contents himself with tracing the successive phases in the growth of individuality in nature, and with indicating in an undogmatic tentative manner some of the implications of this growth. His fundamental thesis is that the universe of nature throughout its history has been in travail to bring forth more highly organized individuals.

The first chapter outlines, in a general and preliminary way, the phases of individuality manifested in the *physical* world. These are the atom, the molecule, stars, and star-systems. He tells us that "on this individualizing process depends all the real work that is done within the universe." But even here, on the abstractly *physical* plane, the individuals interact, and the more varied the individuals become, the higher and more complex become their interactions. Professor Shaler rightly criticises the purely negative conceptions of the ether as the medium of interaction. He suggests that the *apparently* undifferentiated ether represents the lowest potency of individuation. It is to be regretted that he did not give more consideration to the physical aspects of individuality. This phase of the problem certainly needs more clearing up than our metaphysicians have given it. In the second chapter, which deals with organic individuals, we are evidently on more congenial ground. The great distinction between organic and inorganic individuals is found to lie in the capacity of the former to gather and store *experience* (p. 23). Organic individuals are educated by their environment. Now death comes in as an inevitable corollary to advancement by *education*. When the parent form has done its best, it must make room for its successor, that on the stepping stones of its dead self they may rise to higher things. Once death has entered, the chief energies of the individual become centered in the care of offspring. In this way the individual fulfills his part in the educational process of nature. Professor Shaler holds that *natural selection* does not suffice to explain the entrance of death. For definite longevity in a species does

not in itself account for the survival of the species (pp. 47 ff.). Indirectly, death contributes to progress by quietly removing ancient individuals who are no longer useful, as well as defectives. He concludes that death "appears to be an act of service which is enforced on the individual by a power more remote than the acts of its own ancestry, summed up and transmitted by the process of inheritance" (p. 50). In the fourth chapter, he defines an individual broadly as a center of localized movement. In defining the *atom* as a center of completely and permanently equilibrated forces, I think Professor Shaler takes the indestructibility of the atom too seriously. Does not this assumed eternity of the atom introduce a dualism into the conception of individuality? For his next step is to define the individual as a "center of organization of new modes of operation of energy." It follows that the more highly organized an individual is, the more sensitive it is to environmental influences—the more unstable it is (p. 75). Now if, as Professor Shaler rightly says, interaction, interdependence, instability, are marks of highly organized individuality, his atom does not seem entitled to rank as an individual.

Following out the nature of individuality, we are told that the higher individual includes the lower, and this inclusion goes on until we reach the supreme all-containing individual. Attention is called to the progressive organization of individuals which culminates in human association. The conservation of racial experience in successive individuals gives occasion for the suggestive hint that our involuntary, spontaneous, and unconscious thought in normal life, in insanity, in double personality, in genius, is the rekindling of a conscious process handed down from some near or remote ancestor. Professor Shaler finds that after the plane of consciousness has been reached, the most significant factor in the development of individuality is the growth of sympathy. This he traces, with freshness of illustration, through birds and mammals to man. The higher individuality is realized only through sympathy, in which escape is made from the prison-house of the atomic self. Human institutions unite individual lives, so that the gulf of death between the generations is bridged, and the individual coöperates in the onward movement of his kind.

The latter chapters of the book are mainly concerned with social and ethical applications of his doctrine. There are some fine and suggestive passages on the study of individual expression in the face, etc., and on the appreciation of individual differences. As a mitigation of the sorrows of death and parting, Professor Shaler points to contemplation of the place of death in the majestic evolution of life. In considering the usefulness of old age, he combats the popular notion that mental impairment is a necessary accompaniment of bodily decay. The final chapter takes up the question of immortality. Natural science, our author tells us, has nothing positive to say on this theme. He holds that there are, however, no weighty arguments on scientific grounds against immortality. Moreover, he thinks there is a valid indirect argument for the belief, based on the indications of the

activity of a supreme intelligence in nature. He regards the hypothesis of a supreme intelligence as affording much the best explanation of the gradual growth of organized individuality. He calls attention to the kinship between our minds and the order of nature, indicated by our perception of the beautiful in nature. This is, in my opinion, an important consideration which has been too often overlooked. Professor Shaler's conclusion is that if we can assume a supreme intelligence, then the great significance of the individual man in the process of evolution raises the presumption that the historic personalities of men embody and preserve against the ravages of time the purpose and achievement of the visible universe.

The whole work is characterized by the blending of the attainments and temper of the naturalist with a ripe human wisdom. It is in a high degree suggestive, stimulating, and ennobling.

J. A. LEIGHTON.

HOBART COLLEGE.

A Syllabus of an Introduction to Philosophy. By WALTER G. MARVIN. [Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology, and Education.] New York, The Macmillan Co., 1899.—pp. x, 279.

This book is, Dr. Marvin tells us, a syllabus which he has used in connection with a course of lectures on the Introduction to Philosophy given at Columbia University. As an elementary text-book which attempts to give to the beginner his first acquaintance with philosophic thought, the work cannot fail to interest teachers. No more difficult task confronts the teacher of philosophy than that of properly 'introducing' the student to his subject, and no book will meet with a more hearty welcome than the fortunate one which shall finally surmount the difficulties of this task. Neither in method nor in execution, however, can Dr. Marvin's treatment be regarded as contributing very largely to the attainment of the desired end.

The method or form of arrangement is the one common to most introductions. There are two main divisions. Part I. contains a definition of philosophy and a classification of problems. Part II. is a discussion of the problems with constant reference to historical systems and opinions. In this discussion, Dr. Marvin declares his allegiance to an Idealistic system, and attempts by criticism and construction to lead the student to an acceptance of Idealistic principles. Although the method here followed is, as has been noted, the one commonly adopted by writers of introductions, its application to elementary work must be attended with serious difficulties. Such definitions of philosophy as are here given, and such discussions of problems as follow, cannot be properly understood by an untrained student who is unacquainted with the development of philosophic thinking. And further, the attempt to supply an historical setting by disconnected references to the great systems is not successful; the student who knows Kant or Hegel or Plato only through the medium